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The latest media splash on Brexit is a result of the European Research Group’s (ERG) most 
recent publication on the Northern Ireland border[1].  In essence, the ERG is a research 
group run and supported by a group of influential Conservative MPs seeking what has 
colloquially come to be known as a “hard Brexit”.  The well-known Conservative MP, Jacob 
Rees-Mogg is the current chair of the group.  As a group devoted to securing a hard Brexit, it 
is unsurprising that the ERG believes that the issue of the Northern Ireland border has been 
used to prevent their preferred Brexit vision. 
As such, yesterday’s paper on how to solve the “border problem” has been keenly 
awaited.  In spite of the name, the result is not “research” in the sense traditionally 
accepted by academics.  Instead it is argues a particular case drawing on work or statements 
of others – in essence a synthesis of work already done.  The paper begins by attempting to 
set trade across the border in context, arguing that Ireland only accounts for 4.9% of total 
sales.  This is a deeply misleading use of statistics: no country in the world includes domestic 
sales when accounting for the importance of a particular export destination.  As such, 
Ireland is Northern Ireland’s most important export partner by far.  Yes, sales to the British 
mainland are greater than those to Ireland, but even then Ireland remains a crucial trading 
partner.  As for the discussion of the importance of British trade to the Irish Republic, it is 
indeed in Ireland’s interests to ensure trade is as frictionless as possible – as such it is hardly 
surprising that the Republic’s preferred vision of Brexit is rather “softer” than that espoused 
by the ERG.  Ireland is potentially enormously impacted by a policy that it didn’t vote for and 
doesn’t support. 
Similarly misleading are some of the references of the document.  As an example, it is stated 
that, ‘Previous Irish administrations were discussing with the EU similar ways to “obviate the 
need for customs posts.”’[1]  In fact, the work being done was preparatory work to minimise 
the need for customs checks.  The rather selective quotation was not from an official but a 
rather speculative sentence written by a journalist, “However, RTE News understands that 
officials from the Revenue Commissioners have been meeting European Commission 
experts since last Autumn in order to explore ways of using modern technology to all but 
obviate the need for customs posts.”[2]  Once again, “all but obviate” has very different 
connotations, implying that some customs posts would still be needed.  In any case, it is 
clear from the article that the work done was very preliminary and it is far from clear what 
progress was actually made vis-à-vis substantial reductions in border checks 
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More broadly, the thrust of the paper relies upon twin pillars: firstly that VAT is already 
applied without a hard border, and secondly that a variety of technological solutions can 
obviate the need for physical infrastructure and checks.  The problem is that neither of 
these pillars stands up under scrutiny.  It is certainly true that all VAT registered traders 
must report (and be able to show evidence if demanded) exports to HMRC.  Of course, 
traders who are not VAT registered would need to make customs declarations (and it is an 
open question how well compliance could be enforced).  More importantly, however, is the 
issue of who loses out in the event of VAT fraud: the UK exchequer.  Broadly speaking, 
companies do not need to pay UK VAT on goods exported to an Irish company.  In other 
words, VAT fraud in this case defrauds the UK exchequer by declaring goods for export and 
then selling them inside the UK. 
As can be seen, even in the event of VAT fraud by UK companies, the market in the rest of 
the EU is unaffected.  In contrast, were companies to fail to pay customs duties on entry 
into the EU then it is the EU that loses out and whose market is compromised.  In other 
words, the two are fundamentally different issues – one involves defrauding the UK 
exchequer (compromising the UK market) whereas the other involves unauthorised import 
into the EU (compromising the EU market). 
As for the second issue regarding technological solutions on the border, two key issues 
present themselves.  The paper relies heavily on earlier evidence presented to the 
EU[3].  None of the examples of existing borders used in this work avoided some physical 
border controls (and all involved a wait time for some goods crossing). Indeed, the case of 
Norway is anomalous because Norway is part of the European Economic Area!  More 
generally, “nine technologies and ten treaty changes would have to be implemented, 
possibly over a decade”[4].  Given the UK government’s track record in delivering complex IT 
systems on time, this does not inspire confidence. 
That a small proportion of total Irish imports are physically inspected is no consolation: 1% 
of a large number is still a large number.  Customs declarations are waved aside as being 
“similar to VAT” (patently untrue – as pointed out above).  Of course countries endeavour to 
facilitate customs declarations by allowing them to be completed online – this does not (and 
cannot) remove the need for physical infrastructure.  Spot checks still occur.  The reality is 
that the technological situation envisaged by the authors has not been achieved anywhere 
else in spite of enormous incentives to do so. 
Similarly, it is not good enough simply to wave away the potential problem of fraudulent 
declarations of origin (particularly in the case of a UK free trade agreement with a third 
party).  That EU tariffs are on average only 4% masks significant variation and some tariffs 
are much higher.  In any event, the Irish are quite right to insist on a more solid guarantee 
than, “we don’t think this will be a problem and anyway you should trust us”.  The UK would 
do the same if the situation were reversed and would be well within its rights to do 
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so.  Similarly, the fact that Northern Ireland has only a handful of terminals able to handle a 
large quantity of freight is not reassuring – why on earth should the Irish accept any level of 
fraud, particularly when the incentives for HMRC to end it are minimal.  To reiterate – most 
British citizens would be rightly outraged if we were on the receiving end of such practices. 
Again the paragraph on product compliance misses the point.  Product compliance is 
ultimately enforceable on the border.  The fact that it is rarely necessary to do so in practice 
is in part because the border exists: problems with compliance lead to stricter border 
checks.  In terms of phytosanitary rules, even the ERG appear to acknowledge that 
additional checks would be needed were the UK to diverge from “equivalence” with the 
EU’s phytosanitary standards (especially with regard to agricultural produce).  Indeed, even 
“[i]f regulations are recognised as equivalent, there may still be checks to ensure conformity 
with those regulations, although their frequency can be reduced.”[1]  As such, it is clear that 
the proposals from the ERG do not “solve” the border issue in any realistic sense and 
require of the Irish something that the British would (quite rightly) find objectionable if 
applied to ourselves. 
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